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The structure of family relationships influences economic behavior and attitudes. We define our measure
of family ties using individual responses from the World Value Survey regarding the role of the family
and the love and respect that children need to have for their parents for over 70 countries. We show
that strong family ties imply more reliance on the family as an economic unit which provides goods
and services and less on the market and on the government for social insurance.  With strong family
ties home production is higher, labor force participation of women and youngsters, and geographical
mobility, lower. Families are larger (higher fertility and higher family size) with strong family ties,
which is consistent with the idea of the family as an important economic unit. We present evidence
on cross country regressions. To assess causality we look at the behavior of second generation immigrants
in the US and we employ a variable based on the grammatical rule of pronoun drop as an instrument














The family is one of the most important socio economic institutions in our society, but
the nature of the links between family members varies dramatically across nationalities.
Do countries with a culture fostering strong family ties tend to have diﬀerent economic
outcomes than more individualistic societies? While sociologists and political scientists
have paid some attention to this question, this is an issue vastly ignored by economists,
even though the latter do recognize the role of the family in economic decisions.
In this paper we present an empirical investigation of how the strength of family
relationships aﬀects economic outcomes. We construct a cultural measure of family ties,
using individual responses from the World Value Survey on the role of the family and the
love and respect that children need to have for their parents for over 70 countries. Our
hypothesis in the most general terms is that strong family ties societies rely more on the
family than on the market and the government for production of income and insurance.
This basic idea has a host of implications that are important both for understanding
individual behavior and for targeting appropriately public policies.
To begin with we ﬁnd that when family ties are strong there is more reliance on home
production and less participation in market activities, especially in the case of youngsters
and women. In particular the role of women in the family and in the society is diﬀerent.
Strong family ties imply a stricter division of labor with the male working in the market
and the female working at home performing a variety of services, probably including
maintaining the family ties strong. Consistently with this, women education is lower with
strong family ties and fertility higher. Since strong family ties produce social insurance,
less is needed from the government. Family ties and the insurance that they provide can
work only if extended families live close to each other and therefore geographical mobility
is lower. With strong family ties inward looking families trust family members more but
trust non family members less.
Strong family ties are by no mean an economic "bad" on all grounds. With strong
family ties participation in market activities is lower, but home production is higher.
Since home production is by and large not included in GDP statistics, the later could
display a downward bias as a measure of total production (home and market) in countries
with strong family ties. Even though lower market participation may imply a lower
income, family ties reduce the variance of income by providing insurance. On balance,
are people happier or not in cultures with strong family ties? Is there a trade oﬀ between
participation in market activities with their ups and downs and uncertainty, and happiness
or life satisfaction? This is of course an exceptionally diﬃcult question to answer. We
ﬁnd that indeed strong family ties are correlated positively with happiness, at least to the
1extent that happiness data can be trusted.
After establishing these correlations, we address the issue of causality. Although cross
country diﬀerences in family links have most likely long historical roots, we formally ad-
dress this issue of causality in several ways. First, we use second generation immigrants in
the U.S. If diﬀerences in economic behavior as a function of family ties persist among sec-
ond generation immigrants, they cannot be attributed to diﬀerent economic environment,
as all immigrants face the same one. Using second generation immigrants is a good way
of addressing endogeneity, but it is not free of problems. Although the selection problem
is mitigated compared to the ﬁrst generation, second generations are still not a random
sample of the population. Omitted variables remain also a concern: even among second
generation immigrants our cultural variable could capture some factors which are related
to some other characteristics of the countries of origin.
It should be noted that selection in our case goes against ﬁnding an eﬀect of the
strength of family ties on the economic outcomes of second generation immigrants: the
ones who left their countries of origin probably are the less attached to their family in
the ﬁrst place. We address the problem of omitted variables by controlling for some
characteristics of the ethnic communities where second generation immigrants live and
that could be correlated with our family ties proxy. As an additional test for exogeneity,
we use a linguistic instrument related to the structure of diﬀerent languages which is shown
to be correlated to views about family ties, but most likely exogenous to the economic
conditions.
Our paper is related to two lines of research. One is the work by political scientists,
sociologists and some economists on the socio economic role of the family. Early important
work by Banﬁeld (1958) identiﬁed "amoral familism" as one of the main causes of Southern
Italy’s underdevelopment, and Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) recognized that the
lack of reciprocal trust is detrimental to development. Gambetta (1990) shows how a
critical characteristic of the maﬁa "families" is that one can trust only family members,
and that the maﬁa family structure enforces trust in a society lacking it. Esping-Andersen
(1999) has argued that diﬀerences in welfare systems and employment across diﬀerent
European countries can be traced back to diﬀerent family structures. Familistic societies
are characterized by the "male-bread winner and female housewife model", the family
is also seen as the institution able to internalize social risk by pooling resources across
generations as opposed to the State and the Market. Reher (1998) argues that beliefs
of respect for parents are normally associated with speciﬁc forms of living arrangements;
similarly geographic mobility is limited as young people tend to live around their family
nest. Coleman (1988) argues that family ties can facilitate or inhibit social actions. On
2the one hand, the young generation receives support from the old one, on the other this
sense of belonging to a small community can inhibit individual innovation and openness to
new ideas in general. Economists have also noted how in developing countries, especially
in Africa, extended family links have substituted for missing credit markets, as discussed
for instance in La Ferrara (2003)1; there is also a large literature on the relationship
between family-controlled ﬁrms and institutions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer,
1999); and on the relationship between family structure and inheritance norms and the
performance of family businesses (Perez-Gonzales, 2004). Bentolilla and Ichino (2006)
study how countries with diﬀerent family ties (namely Italy and Spain with strong family
ties, the US and the UK with less strong ties) cope with unemployment shocks. They ﬁnd
that the consumption losses after the termination of a job are much lower in Mediterranean
Europe, due to strong family ties. There is also a lot of research in sociology looking at the
importance of family structure, kinship ties and the quality of parent-child relationship in
the study of poverty in lower-class settlements of diﬀerent countries (Lewis, 1959; Winter,
1975).
The second line of research is a recent literature measuring the importance of culture in
the determination of economic outcomes. It includes the impact of culture on development
(Tabellini, 2006) and trade (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2005)), the importance of
religious beliefs for growth (Barro and McCleary, 2003 and 2006), but also microeconomic
studies showing that long lasting cultural diﬀerences can determine outcomes such as
living arrangements (Giuliano, 2003; forthcoming 2007), fertility and female labor force
participation (Fernandez and Fogli, 2005 and Antecol, 2000). The closest paper to the
present one is work by Bertrand and Schoar (2006). Using cross-country evidence the
authors show that strong family ties societies have smaller ﬁrms, more self-employment
and a large fraction of family controlled ﬁrms among listed ﬁrms. They, however, do not
formally address any issue related to endogeneity.2
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents evidence on cross country dif-
ferences using evidence drawn from close to 80 countries. Section 3 focuses on second
generation immigrants in the US. Section 4 discusses our instrument for family ties based
upon linguistic structure and other robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
1Our focus will not be on very poor countries.
2As an indirect way of addressing causality, the authors note that family ties remain constant over
time (at least from the 1980s to today) even for countries experiencing big economic transformations.
32 Cross country evidence
2.1 Data
2.1.1 Data description
We use the 1995-97 and 1999-2000 waves of the World Value Surveys (WWS) and the
Multinational Time Use Study. The World Value survey is a compilation of national
surveys on values and norms on a wide variety of topics. It has been carried out four
times, in 1981-84, 1990-1993, 1995-97 and 1999-2004. The coverage varies depending
on the wave, starting with 22 countries in 1980 and reaching 81 countries in the fourth
wave. The questionnaire contains information on diﬀerent types of attitudes, religion
and preferences, as well as information on standard demographic characteristics (sex, age,
education, labor market status, income, etc.). We use the last wave, including almost
85% of the world’s population. The majority of the surveys in our sample are from 1999-
2001, but we also included 13 countries3 that were surveyed in the 1995 wave, in order
to provide the broadest possible cross-national comparison. Our sample consists of 78
countries with a broad variety of income levels, religion and geography.
We use the Multinational Time Use Study to analyze the impact of family ties on
home production. This survey is a cross-nationally harmonized set of time use surveys
composed of identically recorded variables. Each case in the dataset corresponds to one
diary day. Only records with complete diaries (that added up to 24 hours) are included.
Diaries with more than 60 minutes of unclassiﬁed or missing time are excluded. The
sample of countries is however small: 12 countries covered for the 1990s. Descriptive
statistics for all our outcomes of interest are found in the Appendix.
2.1.2 Weak and strong family ties
We measure the strength of family ties by looking at three WVS variables capturing beliefs
on the importance of the family in an individual’s life, the duties and responsibilities of
parents and children and the love and respect for one own parents. The ﬁrst question
assesses how important is the family in one person’s life and can take values from 1 to
4 (with 1 being very important and 4 not important at all). The second question asks
whether the respondent agrees with one of the two statements (taking the values of 1
and 2 respectively): 1) Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are,
one must always love and respect them, 2) One does not have the duty to respect and
love parents who have not earned it. The third question asks respondents to agree with
3These 13 countries are Azerbaijan, Australia, Armenia, Brazil, Taiwan Province of China, Columbia,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Republic of Georgia, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and Uruguay.
4one of the following statements (again taking the values of 1 or 2 respectively): 1) It
is the parents’ duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own
well-being; 2) Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacriﬁce their
own well being for the sake of their children.
We combine these measures in two ways. First we take the sum of all of them;
given the way the variables are coded, a higher number corresponds to weaker family ties.
Second, we extract the ﬁrst principal component fromthe whole dataset with all individual
responses for the original variables. Table 1 displays the correlation at the country level
between the three original cultural variables, their sum and the ﬁrst principal component.
All of the variables are highly and positively correlated among each other. Note also that
the principal component is almost perfectly correlated with the sum of the three variables;
indicating that the principal component assigns very similar weight to all the variables.
Given the very high correlation between the sum and the principal component we will
use as main cultural variable the ﬁrst principal component.
2.1.3 Who has weak family ties?
Figure 1 displays the values of our measure of the weakness of family ties (expressed using
the ﬁrst principal component) at the country level (panel a). The ranking of the diﬀerent
countries is broadly consistent with perceptions and insights from the sociological and po-
litical science literature. Germany, Netherlands and the Northern European countries are
the countries with the weakest ties, while African, Asian and Latin American countries
lye in the lowest range. If we limit our analysis to the OECD countries (panel b), we ﬁnd
that Mexico, Poland, US, Canada and Southern European countries (with the exception
of Greece) are among the countries with the strongest ties, while as before Northern Eu-
rope, Netherlands and Germany are the group with the weakest ties. We also calculate the
average of family ties by geographical regions (Figure 1c), we found that African, Latin
American, Asian and Southern European countries (plus Ireland4) have the strongest fam-
ily ties. The Northern European group has the lowest family ties followed by Continental
Europe, Central and Eastern Europe and the group including US, Canada, UK, Australia
and New Zealand, that is the group of English speaking Anglo Saxons OECD countries.
The relatively weak family ties of many Central and Eastern European former communist
countries may be the result of Communist collectivist ideology and propaganda.5
4We include Ireland with Southern European countries as it is considered a strong family ties society
by Reher (1998).
5For a discussion of the eﬀect of communism on socio economic preferences of individuals see Alesina
and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007).
52.1.4 Speciﬁcation
For our cross-country empirical analysis, we run a series of regressions of the following
type:
Yij = β0 + β1WFTij + β2Xij + β3γj + ￿ij
where the left hand side variable Yij represents the realization of a certain variable
for individual i in country j. We use either probit or ordered logit or OLS depending
on the nature of Yij. WFTij is our variable of interest deﬁned as "weakness of family
ties". Xij are our controls which vary depending on the left hand side variable. Our
choice of controls is standard and follows the relevant literature, but two observations
are important. First we carefully control for religious variables using as many religious
denominations are available in the WVS. This is important for us because in order to
evaluate the role of family ties we need to control for religious beliefs which may inﬂuence
many of the various left hand side variables which we measure (for instance the role
of women in society and their fertility or labor participation.) Second in the baseline
speciﬁcation we do not control for the respondent’s income because by doing so we would
loose many (about 16,000) observations. However we do control for the level of education
which is correlated with income.
We have rerun all of our regressions controlling for income and all of our results are
qualitatively unchanged. None of the relevant coeﬃcients on family ties looses signiﬁcance
with one minor exception, mentioned below. In order to eliminate the impact of other
country characteristics, all the regressions include country ﬁxed eﬀects, which are likely to
underestimate the eﬀect of family ties to the extent that their impact has been absorbed
in the national culture.
2.2 Market activities versus household production
Our hypothesis is that families with strong ties provide many home produced goods and
services, like child care, home cooking in family meals, caring for the elderly, children
education etc. This of course requires time away from market activities and lower partic-
ipation in the labor force especially for women, and youth who stay at home longer.
We begin with some simple correlations. Figure 2 (Panels a to c) represents the cor-
relations at the country level between female and youth labor force participation, time
spent in home production and the weakness of family ties. The ﬁgures a and b show a
positive correlation between youth and women labor force participation and weak family
ties. As labor force participation is lower in countries with strong family ties, we also
6explore whether this lower level of participation imply more leisure or more home produc-
tion. What people do when they do not work in the market is a topic that has received
much empirical attention recently in the context of a discussion of a decline in hours
worked in the market in some European countries relative to the US.6 Figure 2c shows
the correlation between home production (housework) and family ties in the 12 countries
for which data are available7. Note that using data on time use, Burda, Hammermesh
and Weil (2006) show that men and women work exactly the same amount with variable
shares of market versus non market activities in diﬀerent countries, a result consistent
with the correlation shown above: when women participate less in the labor force they
work more at home. It also appears that women involvement in home production is sub-
stantially higher in strong family ties societies, while this diﬀerence does not exist for men.
According to Eurostat (2004), Spanish women devote one more hour to home production
per day than Swedish women; on the other hand while 92 percent of Swedish men ever
engage in household activities, the fraction is much lower for Spain and Italy where only
70% of men tend to do so.
Now, some statistical analysis. Table 2 reports the results of probit regressions on
female and youth labor force participation. The coeﬃcient on WFT is signiﬁcant with
the expected sign, implying more labor force participation of women and youth. The
reported coeﬃcients are the eﬀect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor
on the probability of being part of the labor force. The probability of participating into
the labor force for women moving from the bottom percentile to the top percentile of
WFT would increase by 16%, that is almost a third in the average of female labor force
participation. For a young person the probability of participating into the labor force will
increase by about 7%.
The coeﬃcient on the other controls are sensible. In the regression for women the
education variables8 have the expected sign and size. More educated women participate
more into the labor force. The fact that in the youth regression primary and secondary
education have a positive sign is due to the fact that the omitted category include all those
attending college or universities (tertiary education) and therefore not in the labor force,
6See Prescott (2004) Blanchard (2004) and Alesina Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005) for instance. Note
how in Scandinavian countries with weak family ties, hours worked in the market per person have declined
much less than in France Germany and Italy with strong family ties, despite a higher rate of taxation.
7Housework is deﬁned as the sum of the following activities: washing, hanging and ironing clothes,
making beds, any form of house cleaning, other manual domestic work, and putting shop away. We do
not consider as home production eating and cooking as to some extent they can be close to the leisure
deﬁnition. We do not also consider kid care as home production since this could be aﬀected by diﬀerent
types of welfare systems.
8The dummies for education include completed elementary education and completed secondary edu-
cation. The excluded group is given by people with some or completed college.
7just yet. When we exclude students from the regressions, our coeﬃcients on primary
and secondary education are negative and signiﬁcant as expected (see column 3). The
omitted category in the religion indicator is Atheists. Note how all coeﬃcients on religion
are negative although mostly not signiﬁcant, except for Catholic and Muslim and Hindu
for which it is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in the women participation regression.
The only religion for which both women and youth labor force participation is signiﬁcantly
lower is the Hindu one.
In Table 3 we regress (OLS) the amount of housework for people 15 to 49 years old
on a quadratic for age, gender and education and our measure of weak family ties. We
merge the individual data on home production coming from the Time Use Survey with our
measure of family ties aggregated at the country level. As we have now individual data
on the time use and country level data on the weakness of family ties, we cannot control
for country ﬁxed eﬀects. However, we control for some other country characteristics that
could drive home production such as per capita GDP and years of education9 (Columns 2
and 3); the standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. Weak family ties
are correlated with less home production. In this case moving from strong to weak family
ties will decrease the amount of home production by about 14 minutes, forty percent of
the average home production in the sample. The other coeﬃcients are very sensible, for
instance the large positive coeﬃcient on women for home production.
As a further robustness check we also control for other cross-country diﬀerences that
could be relevant in the determination of home production. Following Nickel et al. (2006)
and Jaumotte (2003), we ﬁrst control for a series of tax variables. Those variables include
the marginal tax rates facing married women at zero hours of work and when they are
earning 67% of average earnings given their spouses are earning 100% of average earnings,
the marginal tax rate facing a single earner and the average tax wedge10. We also control
for the strictness of employment protection laws11 and for variables capturing public
expenditure on children and parental leave12. Overall, the inclusion of all these variables
does not change our results. Note that we do not have all these additional controls for
our sample. The data are available for only 8 of our countries. For that reason, we ﬁrst
9The data for years of schooling are obtained from Barro-Lee (2003).
10The average tax wedge is the average labor tax rate, the sum of the average payroll, income and
consumption tax rates. The data are taken by Faggio and Nickell (2006).
11The employment protection index comes from Faggio and Nickell (2006) and it refers to regular
employment.
12These variables include real expenditure on cash beneﬁts (annual public expenditures in real dollars
on family cash beneﬁts per child age 0-14 divided by 1,000); real expenditures on parental leave (annual
public expenditure in real dollars on maternity and parental leave per child aged 0-3 divided by 1,000),
real expenditures on family services (annual public expeditures in real dollars on family services per child
aged 0-14 divided by 1,000).
8rerun our basic regression for the restricted sample (column 4) and then we include the
additional controls.
2.3 The role of women and fertility
Lower labor force participation of women aﬀects fertility and reﬂects the perceived role
of women in society. To evaluate the latter we use the following 3 questions from the
WVS: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” In the
original survey the variable could take the values 1(agree), 2 (neither) and 3(disagree).
The second and third variables are phrased as follows “A working mother can establish
just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work”,
and “Being a housewife is just as fulﬁlling as working for pay”. Those two variables can
take the values from 1 (agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). We recode those three variables
so that a higher number represents a higher degree of agreement with each statement.
In Table 4 we present our regressions of the three answers concerning the role of women
(columns 1 to 3) and fertility (column 4) on our measure of the weakness of family ties,
country ﬁxed eﬀects and several individual characteristics, including a quadratic for age,
a dummy for being male (not in column 4 obviously!), dummies for the level of education
and religion. We run OLS regressions but since our left hand side variables are categorical
(for the attitudes variables), we successfully check the robustness of our results running
an ordered logit regression. The coeﬃcient on weak family ties has the expected sign
for all three attitudinal questions (in two out of three they are statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels) and fertility. Moving from a strong to a weak family ties society will
improve substantially the attitudes toward a less traditional role of women in the society:
moving from a weak to a strong family ties society will reduce the probability of thinking
that if jobs are scarce they should go to men by 15%, a 40% of the average attitude in the
sample. Belonging to a weak family ties will also reduce the average number of children
born to a woman by 0.52, a 30% of the sample average. The other controls also make
sense. Men tend to have (more than women) a traditional view about women role. Most
religions (remember that the omitted category is atheist) tend to have a more traditional
view of women and a higher level of fertility.
2.4 Family versus government insurance
An especially important home produced service is insurance against income ﬂuctuations
of family members, both cyclical and related to the life cycle. If this is the case there
is less need of government provided insurance with strong family ties. We consider the
answer to the following question: “Could you please tell me which type of society you
9think this country should aim to be in the future. For each pair of statements, would
you prefer being closer to the ﬁrst or the second alternative? A society with extensive
social welfare, but high taxes (ﬁrst statement) versus a society where taxes are low and
individuals take responsibility for themselves (second statement). The possible values
go from closer to the ﬁrst statement (1) to closer to the second (5). In Table 5 we
show the results. Weak family ties are positively correlated with a preference for an
extensive social welfare. The other controls are consistent with the results of others (see
for instance Alesina and La Ferrara (2005)). Women, youngster and people with lower
income are more pro-government redistribution. We also include as a robustness check a
measure of political attitudes (measured on a scale from 1 to 10 representing whether a
person is more left versus right wing) and our results are unaﬀected. In this regression,
the income variable is especially important; when we rerun the same regressions on the
smaller sample which allows us to include the income of the respondent, our results on
the weak family ties variable is actually even stronger.
2.5 Trust and "inward" attitudes
We deﬁne a variable called trust, based on the following question: “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in
dealing with people?” The variable is equal to 1 if participants report that most people
can be trusted and 0 otherwise.13 In Column 1 of Table 6 we report a regression which
shows that weak family ties imply more trust14. The signs and signiﬁcance of the controls
are consistent with those found in the literature (see Alesina and La Ferrara (2002)); for
instance men trust more than women and less educated people trust less. Moving from
a strong to a weak family ties society will increase the general level of trust by three
percentage points, about 10% of the sample average level of trust. The magnitude of
the impact of family ties is smaller compared to the previous variables however it is not
inferior to the importance of education. For example increasing the level of education
from primary to secondary will increase the level of trust by 2.5 percentage points, about
9% of the sample average of trust in the sample.
Lower trust with strong family ties may capture an inward looking attitude that
may be correlated with other attitudes such as acceptance of new ideas. Some of these
13We are aware of the criticism to the concept of trust versus trustworthiness which emerges form
experiments by Glaeser et al. (2000), but this is an issue which we do not pursue here.
14This is the only regression for which controlling for the respondent income makes a bit of a diﬀerence.
If both income and education are controlled for the variable WFT looses statistical signiﬁcance at the
usual levels maintaining, however, the expected sign. The coeﬃcient on WFT remains signiﬁcant if
income is included and education is not.
10attitudes are measured by the WVS. We consider a question representative of inward
looking attitudes phrased as follows: "Ideas that have stood the test of time are generally
the best" (1) versus "New ideas are generally better than old ones"(10). Weak family ties
lead to more acceptance of new ideas, so does age as expected. Men seem more open than
women, probably a sign of more risk taking behavior. Relative to atheists only Buddhist
seem to be more open to new ideas.
2.6 Happiness
Strong family ties, even though they may imply inward looking attitudes and less market
activities, may indeed make people less unhappy and more satisﬁed with their own life.
We look at two questions representing measures of self-reported happiness or satisfaction
in life. One is: "Taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, quite
happy, not very happy, not all happy" (respondents answered on a 1 to 4 scale with
1=very happy and 4=not very happy at all. We recode this variable so that a higher
number corresponds to happiness). The second is : "All things considered, how satisﬁed
are you with your life as a whole these days?" The variable goes from being dissatisﬁed
(1) to being satisﬁed (10). Self-reported happiness measures have been used by many
authors as proxies for well-being15. Many however remain skeptical about he use of these
variables. We present our results and we let the reader decide.
Table 7 suggests that people belonging to strong family ties societies are happier and
more satisﬁed with their life. The sign and signiﬁcance of the controls are consistent with
those found in the literature (see Di Tella et al., 2001). For instance, women, young,
married and more educated people are happier, while being unemployed makes people
more unhappy. Moving from a strong to a weak family ties society will increase happiness
(life satisfaction) by 0.37 (0.91), about 12% (14%) of the sample average level of happiness
(life satisfaction). Thus, strong family ties imply less participation in market activities,
lower income (at least lower market income without taking into account home production)
but also higher happiness. This consideration may contribute to explain the "puzzle" that
in some cases when comparing income levels and happiness one ﬁnds that the correlation
between the two is far from perfect, a result discussed, for instance, in Layard (2005).
15See for instance, Di Tella, Mc Cullock and Oswald (2001), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Blanchﬂower
and Oswald (2004), Alesina, Di Tella and McCulloch (2004) and Layard (2005).
113 Evidence from second-generation immigrants in the
US
Heterogeneity in family ties may be a result of diﬀerences in institutions or economic
conditions. If cultural values were fairly stable over time, then the impact of economic
and institutional conditions on cultural variables in general and family ties in particular
would be secondary. Bertrand and Schoar (2006) indeed show that measures of family ties
have been stable over time even for countries experiencing big economic transformations.
We formally assess causality studying the impact of diﬀerent forms of family ties in
the original countries on a host of economic outcomes of second generation immigrants
in the US. We restrict the deﬁnition of "second-generation" to native-born individuals
whose fathers were born abroad as it is standard in the literature (see Card, DiNardo and
Estes, 1998). The use of immigrants (ﬁrst or second generation) to study the importance of
culture on economic behavior is becoming relatively standard in the analysis of culture (see
Antecol (2000), Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1994) , Fernandez and Fogli (2005) and Giuliano
(2003, forthcoming 2007) amongst others). By looking at immigrants one holds constant
the economic environment but allows variation in immigrants’ culture. We restrict our
analysis to second generation immigrants, as selection and disruption due to immigration
are less relevant (they are born and raised in the US.)
We associate to each immigrant our measure of family ties deﬁned as the average
set of beliefs toward the family in the original countries.16 If our cultural measure is
important in the determination of economic outcomes those beliefs should be signiﬁcant
for immigrants; if those beliefs are the result of economic conditions or institutions then
this variable should not be important in the determination of economic outcomes among
immigrants, as they are now in a diﬀerent country with the same institutions and economic
environment.
16Note that our sample mainly consists of individuals between 15 and 29 year old, which means that,
since we are considering data from the 1994 to 2005 of the CPS, they are born sometime between 1965
and 1990, so their fathers arrived in the US before that time. Ideally we would like to associate to
those individuals the cultural values of their father country of origin for the period of their arrivals in
the US. Unfortunately, data on beliefs that go so further back in time do not exist. The only thing
we can do, given data availability, is to associate to those immigrants the values that people from their
father’s country of origin hold today. This is a limitation, but not so dramatic, for several reasons. First,
as emphasized before, several recent studies found that cultural diﬀerences between nations remained
quite stable over time (Inglehart and Baker (2000)), moreover values appear pretty stable even for those
countries experiencing dramatic economic changes (see Schwartz, Bardi and Bianchi (2000) for the case
of Central and Eastern Europe). The assumption that culture evolves slowly over time is standard in
the literature (see Tabellini, 2006.) Moreover, at least for the period between 1980 and 2000, Bertrand
and Schoar (2006) found that norms on family values have been pretty stable over time and show little
adjustment to economic conditions, at least in the short or medium run.
12There are some problems in taking the unconditional average of our measure of culture
at the country level: on the one hand, diﬀerent characteristics of the country population
could drive our results (a richer country could be more likely to develop weaker family
ties, similarly for a country with a higher level of education or younger population);
on the other hand, there could be a concern of measurement error if the World Value
Survey opinion polls are not really representative of the country population. To cope
with this problem, we also computed the country measure of family ties after controlling
for individual characteristics (age, sex and education). Our conditional measure of culture
is given then by the coeﬃcients on the country ﬁxed eﬀects. The correlation between the
two measures is very high (0.99) and the results of our regressions do not change when
we use the conditional measure.17
3.1 Data
Our main dataset is the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS), the
only recent available dataset in which individuals were asked (starting from 1994) about
their parents country of origin. We pool eleven years of data to have a higher number of
observations. Given the available data on the CPS we can study the following outcomes:
female and youth labor force participation, female college education, geographical mobility
and living arrangements as measured by the probability of living as young adults in one’s
parents place, and family size. The March Supplement of the CPS however does not
have any information on fertility; for this outcome we rely on the 5% Census 199018.
Unfortunately, for fertility we need to limit our analysis to ﬁrst generation immigrants.
We control in this case for a large set of years of immigration dummies.
3.2 Speciﬁcation
For consistency with the regressions of the previous section, we run the following model
in OLS or probit depending on the nature of the left hand side variable:
Yiks = α0 + α1WFTk + α2Xi + δs + εiks
where Yiks is the left hand side of interest for individual i, living in state s and whose
father comes from country k. Xi includes a series of individual controls which vary
depending on the outcome of interest and are standard in the literature19, WFTk is our
17The results are available from the authors.
18The Census 2000 does not have any information on the number of children ever born to a woman.
19See Blau (1992) and Blau and Kahn (2005) for fertility and labor force participation, and DaVanzo
(1983) for geographical migration.
13measure of the weakness of family ties which varies by immigrants country of origin and
δs is a full set of state dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin
level. The CPS data set allows us to include the household income of the respondents
as one of the controls, without loosing any observation. In the baseline regression we
then include income in constant 1994 dollars but for consistency with the cross-country
analysis we have also run our regressions without it. The results (available upon request)
regarding the eﬀect of family ties are practically identical.
3.3 Market activities versus household production
Tables 8 presents our results for youth labor force participation. To be consistent with
the previous session we deﬁne a dummy equal to one if person i is in the labor force
(labor force participation is deﬁned looking at the number of hours worked last week or
weeks worked last year). The two regressions give identical results, so we report only
the speciﬁcation that looks at the number of weeks worked. In Column (1) we run the
regression just controlling for a quadratic in age and sex, in Column (2) we add education20
and marital status. All the controls have the expected sign. Labor force participation
increases with age and education and it is lower for women. Weak family ties increase
labor participation for youngsters.
Table 9 presents our results for female labor force participation. Women belonging to
weak family ties societies participate more into the labor market. The coeﬃcient, however,
becomes not signiﬁcant once we add the controls, including education. One reason could
that with strong family ties, given their eﬀects on the perception of the women’s role
in the family, women have lower education, and because of that participate less in the
labor force. We explore this hypothesis in Table 10, by looking at the women probability
of going to college. We regress this probability on our measure of family ties, a female
dummy and an interaction between these two variables. If women tend to go to college
more in weak family societies, we should expect a positive sign on the interaction term
coeﬃcient. This is indeed the case. In other words in strong family ties societies women
go less to college and since they are less educated they participate less into the labor force.
3.4 Youth geographical mobility and living arrangements
In countries with strong family ties youth tend to live with their parents for a longer
period of their life and have a lower level of geographical mobility. In tables 11 and
12, we regress our measure of geographical mobility (a dummy equal to 1 if the person
20We include two dummies, one for people with up to 12 years of schooling and one for people with
some college. The excluded group is given by people with completed college and more.
14moved within states, between states or abroad) on a quadratic for age, a female dummy,
marital status, a dummy for being unemployed and family income . The variable on the
weakness of family ties is always signiﬁcant and with the expected sign; youth belonging
to immigrant groups coming from strong family ties societies tend to migrate less and stay
more with their parents than youth belonging to weak family ties societies. This is also
consistent with Giuliano (2007), who uses as proxies for culture both country dummies
and measures of living arrangements in the country of origin. Her sample is limited to only
European countries, while we extend our analysis to youth coming from all the regions
of the world. All the controls have the expected sign. Interesting enough the fraction
of people living at home is higher for men than for women. This could be explained by
a higher dissatisfaction of women in living at their parents’ place (they probably suﬀer
for the traditional role attributed to them in the society and for the amount of home
production, as they tend to carry the burden of it.)
On the magnitude of the impact of family ties: moving from strong to weak family
ties would increase youth participation into the labor market by 20%, more than a third
of the sample average. When we do not include education as a control, the weakness
of family ties increases women’s probability of participating into the labor market by
10%, about 17% of the sample average. The impact on youth geographical mobility and
the probability of living at their parents’ place is even bigger: moving from strong to
weak family ties will increase geographical mobility by 4 percentage points (40% of the
sample average), and the probability of living at home by 11% (about 50% of the sample
average)21.
3.5 The role of women and fertility
Our last two outcomes of interest are family size and fertility (Tables 13 and 14.) The
variable family size counts the number of own family members residing with each individ-
ual. As for the previous speciﬁcation, our variable on family ties is always negative and
signiﬁcant. Strong family ties societies tend to be associated with larger families. Moving
from strong to weak family ties societies would decrease the average number of people in
a family by 0.57, about 20% of the sample average.
As we said before, due to data limitation, we need to run our fertility regression for
ﬁrst generation immigrants, controlling for years of immigration dummies. We run our
main speciﬁcation with married women in the age group 15-5422. Our controls include
21These magnitudes are in line with results by Giuliano (2007).
22We also extend our analysis to all women in the relevant age group, controlling for marital status
ﬁnding similar results.
15a quadratic for age for both husband and wife and level of education for both husband
and wife. Fertility decreases with the level of education of both husband and wife, and it
is an increasing function of both parents’ age, although at a declining rate. Immigrants
coming from countries with weak family ties tend to have a signiﬁcantly lower level of
fertility. Moving from weak to strong family ties reduces the number of children by one,
a reduction which is equal to almost 50 percent of the sample average.
4 Robustness checks
This section provides robustness tests of our ﬁndings on the importance of family ties
to explain several economic outcomes (columns 4 to 7 or 8 in the previous tables.) We
performthe following robustness checks. First, we control for previous measures of culture.
Second, we include the average level of human capital of the ﬁrst generation of the ethnic
group to which each immigrant belong. Finally we test the robustness of our results to
the exclusion of Mexicans, the biggest immigrant group in our sample.
Columns (4) to (6) in all the previous tables include as regressors measures of economic
outcome of interests in the country of origin, whenever available. Previous papers (Antecol
(2000), Giuliano (2003) and Fernandez and Fogli (2005)) used quantitative variables in the
country of origin as a measure of culture. Those measures should summarize economic,
institutional and cultural conditions in the country of origin, but if they are signiﬁcant for
second generation immigrants only cultural beliefs should be relevant. Particularly, we
include both contemporaneous and past country of origin variables as alternative measures
of culture. As discussed in Fernandez and Fogli (2005) it is not clear, a priori, if we should
attach to the second generation immigrants measures of culture that are contemporaneous
or the measure of cultures that their parents brought when they arrive in the US.
Our measure of family ties remains statistically signiﬁcant even after including those
variables23. Our variable appears to capture better the beliefs relevant to determine
second generation immigrant economic outcomes than the variable representing the same
economic outcome in the country of origin. One possible interpretation of this ﬁnding
is that the relationship between country of origin variables and our measure of culture,
ultimately passes through the importance of the family. In other words, the importance
23Our variable of family ties loose signiﬁcance only when we include the measure of family size in
the original countries for the 1990 and 1980, this could be simply due to the much smaller number of
observations, due to lack of information on this variable in the original country. The coeﬃcient remains
of similar magnitudes and sign. Note also that we cannot include country of origin variables in the
regressions for geographical mobility and living arrangements. For living arrangements those data are
available for a very limited set of European countries, and there are no data on geographical mobility for
the original countries.
16of economic outcomes in the original countries for the economic outcomes of immigrant
is a function of family values in a society. Alternatively, our family variable might be a
better proxy for culture than the other commonly used measures of culture.
As a second robustness check, we investigate if our results are robust to the inclusion of
the mean level of human capital of the ethnic group of the fathers’ country of origin of our
second generation immigrants. This is a standard control in the literature of immigrants
assimilation or the role of network24; our measure of family ties could indeed simply
capture some omitted variables and the level of human capital of the ﬁrst generation
could be the major culprit . We calculate the average level of education for ﬁrst generation
immigrants from the Census 1970 as a measure of ethnic human capital (we chose the
Census 1970 because the immigrants who were in the US in this period were very likely to
be the fathers of second generation immigrants in our sample)25. Our results are robust
to the inclusion of this variable.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we repeat our speciﬁcation excluding the Mexicans, to be
sure that our results are not driven by the biggest immigrant group in our sample. The
exclusion of Mexican second generation immigrants does not change our results.
4.1 An instrument based upon language
Although in the previous section we do our best to control for omitted variables by in-
cluding the measure of the ethnic human capital from the ethnic group of origin and
several country of origin measures, omitted variables could still remain a concern. As an
additional test for exogeneity we then instrument our family ties variable using a gram-
matical rule denoting the use of pronoun as an instrument for culture.26 The relationship
between language and culture has been a major issue of concern for applied psychology
and anthropology. Hill and Mannheim (1992) suggest that grammatical categories trans-
mit and reproduce culture and social categories. Similarly Kashima and Kashima (1998)
try to test the correlation between global cultural characteristics of cultures and rules of
24See Card (1998), Luttmer (2001), Fernandez and Fogli (2005) and Blau (2006). The importance of
the ethnic human capital was ﬁrst introduced by Borjas (1992 and 1995), who showed that educational
attainment and wages of second generation immigrants in the Census 1970 crucially depend on the mean
level of human capital of the ethnic group of their fathers’ country of origin (deﬁned as the human capital
of the ﬁrst generation immigrants).
25We calculate the average level of education (deﬁned as the average of the educational variable in the
Census, taking values from 1 to 9, with 1 being no education and 9 more than college) for men between 15
and 45 years old. Those men should be approximately correspond to the fathers of our second generation
immigrants.
26This variable considering the grammatical rule on pronoun drop has been used for the ﬁrst time by
Licht et al. (1994) as an instrument for cultural emphasis on embeddedness versus autonomy. When they
instrument culture with pronoun drop the authors ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of culture on governance.
17language used in those cultures. Some colorful evidence (Semin and Rubini (1990)) also
shows that there is a relationship between individualism-collectivism and verbal abuses.
We use the intuition of Kashima and Kashima (1998), that language may embed a
particular conception about relationships among people. They suggest that the linguistic
practice of pronoun drop, particularly the omission of the ﬁrst-person singular pronoun
(e.g., "I" in English), is linked to the psychological diﬀerentiation between the speaker
and the context of speech. Societies more individualistic in nature tend to emphasize the
importance of the individual in the context of speech, so they tend to keep the ﬁrst-person
singular pronoun. More collectivistic societies, on the other hand, tend to drop the ﬁrst
pronoun.
Our hypothesis is that societies with weak family ties are more individualistic, there-
fore should be associated with pronoun drop. This intuition is conﬁrmed from the very
high correlation between family ties and the linguistic variable on pronoun drop: the cor-
relation is 0.55. The list of countries belonging to the two diﬀerent language structures
is also described in Table A5. The instrument is very unlikely to be related to the eco-
nomic outcomes of second generation immigrants, who also have English as their primary
language. Tables 15 and 16 report the results of the instrumental variables regressions.
All the results are consistent with the corresponding OLS models, exhibiting only slightly
higher coeﬃcients. Table 17 reports the coeﬃcients on the variable on pronoun drop
coming from our ﬁrst stage regressions.
5 Conclusions
The family is a key socio economic unit in society and the nature of its organization
greatly varies across nationalities. In some cultures/nationalities family ties are weak and
members only feel obligated up to a point to be linked to others members of the family.
In other cultures family ties are strong. We measure family ties based on answers from
the World Value Survey and we show that strong family ties imply more home production
of goods and services and less participation in market activities especially for women and
youngsters which stay at home longer. This is associated with higher fertility (family
ties may also provide child care services) and a more "traditional" role for women, with
less education and more work at home. Strong family ties are also associated with less
geographical mobility since ties are more useful if people live close to each other. Family
with strong ties trust family members more but trust others outside the family less and
are inward looking. On the positive side, people belonging to strong family ties societies
appear to be happier and satisﬁed with their life.
18In order to mitigate problems of reverse causation and endogeneity of cultural traits
to economic outcomes we use second-generation immigrants in the US as a test that holds
constant the economic environment but allows variation in immigrants’ culture. We also
use an instrument based on linguistic characteristics, on the assumption that the language
structure is correlated (as it is) to beliefs about individualistic versus groups relationships.
Overall both the size and the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients imply a large eﬀect
of the nature of family relationships on economic structures. These considerations are
important for the design of public polices since the same set of interventions may have
very diﬀerent eﬀects in countries with diﬀerent family ties.
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Table 1 
Correlation among Family Values 
 









Family Important  1.0000          
           
Parental Duties  0.3558  1.0000        
           
Respect and Love Par.   0.5585  0.5225  1.0000      
           
Principal Component  0.6910  0.8514  0.8506  1    
           
Sum  0.5364  0.8391  0.9012  0.9740    1 
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Table2 
Family ties, Youth and Female Labor Force Participation 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Women LFP  Youth LFP  Youth LFP 
(excluding students) 
Weak family ties  0.015  0.008  0.009 
  (0.003)***  (0.003)**  (0.001)*** 
Primary  -0.224  0.108  -0.184 
  (0.008)***  (0.009)***  (0.011)*** 
Secondary  -0.093  0.131  -0.070 
  (0.007)***  (0.008)***  (0.005)*** 
Age  0.084  0.213  -0.026 
  (0.002)***  (0.012)***  (0.006)*** 
Age squared  -0.001  -0.004  0.000 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Catholic  -0.031  -0.009  0.001 
  (0.013)**  (0.014)  (0.006) 
Protestant  -0.018  -0.009  0.001 
  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.007) 
Orthodox  0.010  -0.028  -0.001 
  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.012) 
Jews  -0.072  0.006  0.033 
  (0.053)  (0.058)  (0.010)*** 
Muslim  -0.069  -0.025  -0.035 
  (0.017)***  (0.019)  (0.011)*** 
Hindu  -0.065  -0.105  -0.035 
  (0.030)**  (0.037)***  (0.036) 
Buddhist  -0.032  -0.027  -0.031 
  (0.026)  (0.035)  (0.026) 
Other  0.017  -0.003  -0.008 
  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.007) 
Married  -0.124     
  (0.009)***     
Single  0.096     
  (0.011)***     
Male    0.274  0.259 
    (0.006)***  (0.005)*** 
Observations  40763  26138  19926 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, regressions controls for country fixed effects 
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Table 3 
Family Ties and Home Production 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
                     
Weak fam. ties  -7.546  -8.171  -7.482  -10.057  -14.694  -12.465  -12.052  -14.201  -7.025  -10.362 
  (4.074)*  (2.751)**  (3.040)**  (5.189)*  (3.837)***  (2.489)***  (2.962)***  (3.912)***  (3.632)*  (4.550)* 
Age  8.311  8.197  8.166  8.545  8.553  8.560  8.514  8.534  8.601  8.587 
  (0.694)***  (0.722)***  (0.726)***  (0.851)***  (0.830)***  (0.837)***  (0.848)***  (0.844)***  (0.836)***  (0.856)*** 
Age squared  -0.102  -0.100  -0.100  -0.103  -0.103  -0.104  -0.103  -0.103  -0.104  -0.104 
  (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.011)***  (0.011)***  (0.011)***  (0.011)***  (0.011)***  (0.011)***  (0.011)*** 
Secondary educ.  -7.639  -6.099  -5.453  -7.110  -6.917  -7.114  -6.588  -6.703  -7.359  -7.745 
  (2.048)***  (2.341)**  (2.495)*  (2.791)**  (2.812)**  (2.785)**  (3.018)*  (2.671)**  (2.611)**  (2.738)** 
Tertiary educ.  -16.005  -13.313  -12.360  -14.046  -13.933  -14.122  -13.334  -13.598  -14.155  -14.813 
  (2.180)***  (2.486)***  (2.638)***  (2.805)***  (2.839)***  (2.911)***  (3.154)***  (2.620)***  (2.630)***  (2.903)*** 
Employed  -29.473  -29.157  -29.066  -29.779  -29.803  -29.734  -29.859  -29.809  -29.979  -29.629 
  (3.573)***  (3.557)***  (3.575)***  (4.329)***  (4.370)***  (4.357)***  (4.349)***  (4.435)***  (4.361)***  (4.350)*** 
Female  53.616  53.726  53.745  55.657  55.694  55.739  55.702  55.686  55.604  55.723 
  (6.595)***  (6.574)***  (6.583)***  (8.360)***  (8.357)***  (8.344)***  (8.357)***  (8.335)***  (8.350)***  (8.356)*** 
Real GDP    -0.000    -0.001  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  -0.000 
    (0.000)***    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Years of educ. 
(Barro-Lee) 
















Marginal tax rate, 
single (100) 




     
Marginal tax rate, 
spouse (100,0) 
        -2.580 
(10.006) 
  -7.280 
(10.194) 
     
Marginal tax rate, 
spouse (100,67) 
        37.610 
(29.146) 
  -10.768 
(25.977) 
     
Real expenditure on 
cash benefits per 
child (0-14) 
                4.348 
(2.776) 
 
Real expenditure on 
parental leave per 
child (0-3) 
                0.622 
(0.498) 
 
Real Expenditure on 
family services per 
child (0-14) 
                -1.192 
(4.237) 
   26 
Employment 
Protection Index 
              4.414 
(1.258)*** 
   
Average tax wedge                    33.360 
                    (12.146)** 
Observations  132588  132588  132588  102555  102555  102555  102555  102555  102555  102555 
R-squared  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.24 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level 
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Table 4 
Family Ties, the Role of Women in the Society and Fertility 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Job Scarce  Woman Housewife  Working Mom  Fertility 
Weak Family Ties  -0.017  -0.052  -0.001  -0.071 
  (0.001)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)  (0.006)*** 
Male  0.095  0.065  -0.162   
  (0.003)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)***   
Primary Education  0.165  0.168  -0.155  0.963 
  (0.004)***  (0.009)***  (0.008)***  (0.020)*** 
Secondary Education  0.078  0.065  -0.079  0.372 
  (0.004)***  (0.008)***  (0.007)***  (0.016)*** 
Age  0.001  0.002  0.003  0.271 
  (0.000)***  (0.001)*  (0.001)***  (0.004)*** 
Age Squared  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.003 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Catholic  0.033  0.044  -0.000  0.053 
  (0.006)***  (0.013)***  (0.012)  (0.030)* 
Protestant  0.029  0.044  -0.026  0.105 
  (0.007)***  (0.015)***  (0.014)*  (0.034)*** 
Orthodox  0.023  -0.019  -0.027  -0.006 
  (0.011)**  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.047) 
Jews  0.056  0.031  0.042  0.359 
  (0.023)**  (0.048)  (0.045)  (0.111)*** 
Muslim  0.114  0.066  -0.100  0.271 
  (0.010)***  (0.019)***  (0.018)***  (0.045)*** 
Hindu  0.098  0.056  -0.028  0.057 
  (0.018)***  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.067) 
Buddhist  0.038  0.013  -0.014  -0.024 
  (0.014)***  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.052) 
Other  0.039  0.026  -0.068  0.176 
  (0.008)***  (0.015)*  (0.014)***  (0.036)*** 
Observations  92262  82588  84967  36197 
R-squared  0.21  0.10  0.09  0.44 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, regressions control for country fixed effects 
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Table 5  
Family Ties and the Role of the Government 
  (1) 
  Extensive welfare 
(lower number) or 
people 
responsibility 
Weak family ties  -0.021 
  (0.012)* 
Male  0.043 
  (0.023)* 
Primary  -0.023 
  (0.035) 
Secondary  -0.022 
  (0.032) 
Age  0.015 
  (0.005)*** 
Age squared  -0.000 
  (0.000)*** 
Catholic  0.043 
  (0.042) 
Protestant  0.003 
  (0.060) 
Orthodox  0.188 
  (0.068)*** 
Jews  -0.081 
  (0.234) 
Muslim  -0.025 
  (0.057) 
Hindu  -0.096 
  (0.123) 
Buddhist  0.110 
  (0.056)** 
Other  0.116 
  (0.054)** 
Married  -0.038 
  (0.042) 
Single  0.025 
  (0.052) 
Observations  15253 
R-squared  0.11 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, regressions control for country fixed 
effects 
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Table 6 
Family Ties, Trust and Inward Looking Attitudes 
  (1)  (2) 
  Trust  New ideas are 
better than old 
ones 
Weak Ties  0.004  0.064 
  (0.001)***  (0.014)*** 
Male  0.013  0.139 
  (0.003)***  (0.028)*** 
Primary education  -0.093  -0.064 
  (0.004)***  (0.040) 
Secondary education  -0.068  0.043 
  (0.004)***  (0.035) 
Age  0.002  -0.029 
  (0.000)***  (0.005)*** 
Age squared  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)** 
Catholic  0.002  0.004 
  (0.006)  (0.049) 
Protestant  0.017  -0.055 
  (0.008)**  (0.056) 
Orthodox  -0.014  -0.128 
  (0.011)  (0.116) 
Jews  0.049  0.058 
  (0.024)**  (0.169) 
Muslim  0.037  0.048 
  (0.009)***  (0.097) 
Hindu  0.027  0.024 
  (0.016)*  (0.132) 
Buddhist  0.012  0.399 
  (0.014)  (0.162)** 
Other  0.013  -0.064 
  (0.007)*  (0.063) 
Observations  89314  37033 
R-squared  0.10  0.18 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, regressions control for country fixed effects 
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Table 7 
Family Ties, Happiness and Life Satisfaction 
  (1)  (2) 
  Happiness  Life Satisfaction 
Weak ties  -0.050  -0.122 
  (0.002)***  (0.008)*** 
Male  -0.036  -0.093 
  (0.005)***  (0.016)*** 
Primary  -0.145  -0.519 
  (0.007)***  (0.022)*** 
Secondary  -0.044  -0.260 
  (0.006)***  (0.020)*** 
Employed  -0.001  0.038 
  (0.006)  (0.020)* 
Unem  -0.146  -0.618 
  (0.010)***  (0.033)*** 
Age  -0.016  -0.056 
  (0.001)***  (0.003)*** 
Age squared  0.000  0.001 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Married  0.277  0.652 
  (0.008)***  (0.027)*** 
Single  0.125  0.347 
  (0.011)***  (0.034)*** 
Catholic  0.064  0.141 
  (0.010)***  (0.033)*** 
Protestant  0.099  0.347 
  (0.012)***  (0.038)*** 
Orthodox  0.032  0.008 
  (0.018)*  (0.065) 
Jews  -0.031  0.099 
  (0.039)  (0.123) 
Muslim  0.037  0.123 
  (0.015)**  (0.053)** 
Hindu  0.053  0.268 
  (0.028)*  (0.085)*** 
Buddhist  0.019  0.184 
  (0.020)  (0.067)*** 
Other  0.057  0.106 
  (0.012)***  (0.039)*** 
Observations  88531  89317 
R-squared  0.17  0.23 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, regressions control for country fixed effects 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 8 
Family Ties and Youth Labor Force Participation  
Second Generation Immigrants, 15-29 years old 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Youth LFP  Youth LFP  Youth LFP  Youth LFP  Youth LFP  Youth LFP  Youth LFP  Youth LFP 
(no Mexican) 
Weak Family Ties  0.100  0.092  0.084  0.091  0.082  0.083  0.091  0.091 
  (0.021)***  (0.022)***  (0.024)***  (0.023)***  (0.027)***  (0.027)***  (0.024)***  (0.025)*** 
Age  0.424  0.404  0.410  0.408  0.403  0.403  0.403  0.331 
  (0.034)***  (0.032)***  (0.029)***  (0.033)***  (0.033)***  (0.033)***  (0.033)***  (0.025)*** 
Age squared  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.006 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
Female  -0.078  -0.084  -0.080  -0.085  -0.082  -0.082  -0.082  -0.058 
  (0.013)***  (0.013)***  (0.012)***  (0.012)***  (0.013)***  (0.013)***  (0.013)***  (0.012)*** 
Up to 12 years of school.    -0.093  -0.066  -0.095  -0.089  -0.089  -0.091  -0.098 
    (0.026)***  (0.025)***  (0.022)***  (0.027)***  (0.027)***  (0.026)***  (0.030)*** 
Some college    -0.030  -0.016  -0.037  -0.029  -0.029  -0.029  -0.048 
    (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.025)* 
Married    0.023  0.028  0.024         
    (0.015)  (0.015)*  (0.015)*         
Divorced    0.054  0.065  0.061         
    (0.023)**  (0.022)***  (0.021)***         
Real household income      0.000  0.000         
      (0.000)***  (0.000)***         
Ethnic Human Capital        -0.021         
        (0.008)***         
Youth LFP 1980 original country              0.000   
              (0.002)   
Youth LFP 1990 original country            0.001     
            (0.002)     
Youth LFP 2000 original country          0.001       
          (0.002)       
Observations  22831  22831  22831  22166  22675  22675  22675  11541 
Marginal Effects From Probit Regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level and control for state fixed effects    32 
Table 9 
Family Ties and Female Labor Force Participation  
Second Generation Immigrants 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Female LFP  Female LFP  Female LFP  Female LFP  Female LFP  Female LFP  Female LFP 
(no Mexicans) 
Weak Family Ties  0.045  0.015  0.010  0.017  0.021  0.021  0.023 
  (0.015)***  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Age  0.071  0.062  0.062  0.062  0.062  0.062  0.056 
  (0.005)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)*** 
Age squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Up to 12 years of school    -0.199  -0.171  -0.178  -0.201  -0.201  -0.184 
    (0.014)***  (0.012)***  (0.014)***  (0.016)***  (0.016)***  (0.013)*** 
Some College    -0.034  -0.015  -0.020  -0.036  -0.036  -0.052 
    (0.017)**  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.018)**  (0.018)**  (0.016)*** 
Married    -0.058  -0.068  -0.071  -0.058  -0.058  -0.081 
    (0.019)***  (0.020)***  (0.020)***  (0.019)***  (0.019)***  (0.011)*** 
Divorced    0.064  0.073  0.070  0.064  0.064  0.043 
    (0.014)***  (0.015)***  (0.016)***  (0.014)***  (0.014)***  (0.015)*** 
Real hous. Income      0.000  0.000       
      (0.000)***  (0.000)***       
Ethnic Human Capital        -0.018       
        (0.008)**       
Female LFP 1990            -0.001   
            (0.001)   
Female LFP 2000          -0.001     
          (0.001)     
Observations  26547  26547  26547  26091  26459  26459  17011 
   Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level and control for state fixed effects  
                * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10  
College Education and Family Ties 
(Dependent Variables, Dummy for Having at Least Some Years of College) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 











Weak Family Ties  0.095  0.085  0.073  0.120  -0.008 
  (0.068)  (0.058)  (0.036)**  (0.063)*  (0.043) 
Female  0.058  0.062  0.064  0.058  0.064 
  (0.005)***  (0.005)***  (0.005)***  (0.005)***  (0.007)*** 
Female* 











Age  0.317  0.315  0.310  0.303  0.428 
  (0.054)***  (0.056)***  (0.054)***  (0.053)***  (0.025)*** 
Age squared  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  -0.008 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
Real Hous. Income    0.000  0.000     
    (0.000)***  (0.000)***     
Ethnic Human Capital      0.069     
      (0.009)***     
Girls to Boys ratio in 
Tertiary Education 
      0.124 
(0.123) 
 
           
Observations  22831  22831  22166  20602  11541 
R-squared  0.30  0.32  0.33  0.30  0.40 
   Standard errors are clustered at the country level, the regressions control for state fixed effects 
                * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         34 
Table 11 
Family Ties and Geographical Mobility 
15-29 Years Old Second Generation Immigrants 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 













Weak family ties  0.020  0.016  0.028  0.029  0.030  0.017 
  (0.005)***  (0.005)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)*** 
Age  0.027  0.031  0.040  0.033  0.035  0.038 
  (0.004)***  (0.004)***  (0.011)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.007)*** 
Age squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Female   0.001  -0.001  -0.005  -0.005  -0.007  0.004 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Up to 12 years of school    -0.041  -0.046  -0.049  -0.054  -0.038 
    (0.006)***  (0.005)***  (0.005)***  (0.006)***  (0.008)*** 
Some College    -0.040  -0.050  -0.049  -0.053  -0.044 
    (0.003)***  (0.005)***  (0.004)***  (0.005)***  (0.006)*** 
Married    0.019  0.011  0.009  0.010   
    (0.004)***  (0.006)*  (0.006)  (0.006)   
Divorced    0.026  0.033  0.027  0.027   
    (0.009)***  (0.010)***  (0.010)***  (0.010)***   
Unemployed      0.031  0.027  0.027   
      (0.007)***  (0.007)***  (0.007)***   
Real hous. income        -0.000  -0.000   
        (0.000)***  (0.000)***   
Ethnic Human Capital        0.002     
        (0.002)     
Observations  21253  21253  11987  11710  11987  10659 
Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions. Standard Errors are clustered at the country of origin level, 
the regressions control for state fixed effects           
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Table 12 
Living at Home with Their Parents 
Second Generation Immigrants 
18-33 Years Old 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Living at Home  Living at Home  Living at Home  Living at Home 
(no Mexicans) 
Weak Family Ties  -0.053  -0.062  -0.062  -0.079 
  (0.029)*  (0.026)**  (0.026)**  (0.022)*** 
Age  -0.200  -0.193  -0.193  -0.210 
  (0.014)***  (0.015)***  (0.015)***  (0.022)*** 
Age squared  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Female  -0.111  -0.100  -0.099  -0.101 
  (0.008)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.013)*** 
Up to 12 years of school.  -0.061  0.023  0.015  -0.053 
  (0.015)***  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.017)*** 
Some College  0.037  0.089  0.080  0.036 
  (0.018)**  (0.018)***  (0.016)***  (0.023) 
Real Hous. Income    0.000  0.000   
    (0.000)***  (0.000)***   
Ethnic Human Capital      0.001   
      (0.010)   
Observations  19664  19664  19186  10642 
Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the country level, 
Regressions control for state fixed effects 
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Table 13 
Family Ties and Family size 
Second Generation Immigrants 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Family size  Family size  Family size  Family size  Family size  Family size  Family size  Family size 
Weak Family Ties  -0.325  -0.275  -0.305  -0.242  -0.230  -0.330  -0.280  -0.154 
  (0.076)***  (0.059)***  (0.070)***  (0.072)***  (0.133)  (0.172)*  (0.161)  (0.065)** 
Age  -0.061  -0.051  -0.058  -0.061  -0.063  -0.055  -0.064  -0.038 
  (0.009)***  (0.008)***  (0.009)***  (0.008)***  (0.006)***  (0.009)***  (0.004)***  (0.005)*** 
Age squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)**  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*  (0.000)***  (0.000) 














Some college    0.097  0.261  0.223  0.222  0.129  0.224  0.078 
    (0.039)**  (0.040)***  (0.030)***  (0.074)***  (0.069)*  (0.087)**  (0.036)** 
Ethnic Human Capital        -0.194         
        (0.032)***         
Fam. size 1980 orig. 
country 
            0.020   
              (0.050)   
Fam. size 1970 orig. 
country 
          -0.031     
            (0.093)     
Fam. size 1990 orig. 
country 
        0.067       
          (0.059)       
Hous. Real income      0.000  0.000         
      (0.000)***  (0.000)***         
Observations  80964  80964  80964    31789  42467  29863  60419 
R-squared  0.32  0.33  0.36    0.28  0.33  0.29  0.28 
Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level, the regressions control for state fixed effects 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             37 
Table 14 
Family Ties and Fertility (Number of Children ever Born)  
First Generation Immigrants, Married Women 15-54 Years Old 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Fertility  Fertility  Fertility 
(no Mexicans) 
Weak Family Ties  -0.778  -0.546  -0.510 
  (0.177)***  (0.231)**  (0.085)*** 
Age_wife  0.155  0.156  0.142 
  (0.017)***  (0.017)***  (0.023)*** 
Age squared_wife  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Up to 12_ wife  0.702  0.732  0.518 
  (0.094)***  (0.100)***  (0.049)*** 
Some college_wife  0.232  0.255  0.212 
  (0.039)***  (0.044)***  (0.018)*** 
Age_husband  0.115  0.115  0.095 
  (0.018)***  (0.019)***  (0.017)*** 
Age squared_husband  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Up to 12_husband  0.506  0.539  0.226 
  (0.113)***  (0.110)***  (0.045)*** 






Fertility 1990    0.104   
    (0.064)   
Observations  93261  89429  60898 
R-squared  0.28  0.28  0.21 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level, the regressions control for state fixed 
effects and years of immigration dummies 
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Table 15 
Instrumental variable regressions 
Instrumenting Family Ties with Language Pronoun Drop 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Youth LFP  Women LFP  Geographical 
mobility 





Weak family ties  0.138  0.028  0.042  -0.399  0.033  -0.117 
  (0.054)**  (0.033)  (0.012)***  (0.211)*  (0.079)  (0.039)*** 
Age  0.355  0.057  0.028  -0.058  0.310  -0.202 
  (0.019)***  (0.005)***  (0.004)***  (0.009)***  (0.055)***  (0.011)*** 
Age squared  -0.007  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  -0.006  0.003 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)***  (0.000)*** 
Up to 12 years of 
school. 
-0.023  -0.149  -0.060  0.550    -0.005 
  (0.015)  (0.011)***  (0.010)***  (0.101)***    (0.013) 
Some college  0.018  0.004  -0.071  0.249    0.053 
  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.009)***  (0.046)***    (0.013)*** 
Real hous. 
income 
0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Female  -0.056    -0.001  -0.077  0.070  -0.076 
  (0.009)***    (0.003)  (0.034)**  (0.007)***  (0.010)*** 
Female*(weak 
family ties) 
        0.081 
(0.032)** 
 
Observations  22329  26048  20782  79242  22329  19313 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level, regressions control for state fixed effects 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  39 
Table 16 
Fertility 
Instrumenting Family Ties with Language Pronoun Drop 
  (1) 
  Fertility 
Weak Family Ties  -.9417 
(.3901)** 
   
Age_wife  .1584 
(.0181)*** 
   
Age squared_wife  -.0013 
(.000)*** 
   
Up to 12_ wife  .7048 
  (.1143)*** 
Some college_wife  .2532 
  (.0592)*** 
Age_husband  .1165*** 
  (.0198) 
Age squared_husband  -.0011*** 
  (.0002) 
Up to 12_husband  .4800*** 
  (.1098) 
Some College_husband  .0253 
  (.0516) 
Observations  88265 
R-squared  .28 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level, regressions control for 
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Region 1  US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
Region 2  Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland 
Region 3  Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland 
Region 4  Ireland, Italy, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Spain 
Region 5 
Japan, China, Bangladesh, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, Rep. of Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Singapore, Vietnam 
Region 6 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
Region 7  Iran, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco 
Region 8  South africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda 
Region 9 
Belarus, Albania, Georgia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Russian Fed., Ukraine, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia 
   Poland, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Region 10  Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan 
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Figure 2 
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b) Family Ties and Youth Labor Force Participation 
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Figure 3 
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World Values Survey- Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
           
Family Important  116914  1.123  0.383  1  4 
Respect Parents  110068  1.169  0.375  1  2 
Parents Responsibility  110594  1.193  0.395  1  2 
Family Ties (sum)  106762  3.461  0.724  3  8 
Family ties (PC)  106762  0.000  1.118  -0.72  6.48 
Trust  114203  0.269  0.443  0  1 
Happiness  112832  3.041  0.749  1  4 
Life Satisfaction  117264  6.525  2.580  1  10 
When job scarce  118519  0.357  0.479  0  1 
Working mom  104888  2.981  0.852  1  4 
Woman housewife  101349  2.806  0.883  1  4 
People/Govern. Responsibility  111898  5.875  3.022  1  10 
Private Ownership  90468  5.086  2.935  1  10 
Old/New Ideas  73735  1.950  0.536  1  3 
Competition  89379  3.654  2.551  1  10 
Age  118224  40.981  16.271  15  101 
Employed  116280  0.518  0.500  0  1 
Unemployed  116280  0.093  0.290  0  1 
Out of Labor Force  116280  0.352  0.478  0  1 
Male  118519  0.480  0.500  0  1 
Female Labor Force Particip.  53754  0.574  0.4944  0  1 
Youth Labor Force Particip.  34567  0.653  0.4760  0  1 
Fertility  44049  1.795  1.630  0  8 
Primary Education  118519  0.369  0.483  0  1 
Secondary Education  118519  0.418  0.493  0  1 
College and more  118519  0.204  0.403  0  1 
Catholic  103620  0.353  0.478  0  1 
Protestant  103620  0.137  0.343  0  1 
Orthodox  103620  0.089  0.285  0  1 
Jews  103620  0.014  0.117  0  1 
Muslim  103620  0.191  0.393  0  1 
Hindu  103620  0.019  0.136  0  1 
Buddhist  103620  0.015  0.122  0  1 
Other Religions  103620  0.088  0.283  0  1 
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Table A2 
Multinational Time Use Study – Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
           
Age  145086  32.64  9.70  15  49 
Home production  145086  48.67  77.23  0  900 
Employed  133950  0.69  0.46  0  1 
Secondary education  132588  0.34  0.47  0  1 
Tertiary education  132588  0.29  0.45  0  1 
Female  145086  0.53  0.50  0  1 
Countries included in the survey are: Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, 
United Kingdom, United States, Italy, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, South Africa  50 
Table A3 
Second Generation Immigrants 





Variable     Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Family Size  80964  2.909  1.719  1  16 
Youth Lab. Force Par.  22831  .5915  .4915  0  1 
Female Lab. Force Par.  26547  .6661  .4714  0  1 
Stay home  19664  0.417  0.493  0  1 
Geographical mobility  21268  0.062  0.241  0  1 
Going to college  22831  0.362  0.481  0  1 
 
Country of origin variables 
 
Variable     Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Fam. size 1990  14290  4.877  0.520  2.2  5.4 
Fam. size 1980  13551  5.231  0.467  2.3  6.6 
Fam. size 1970  15656  4.824  0.679  2.6  6.6 
Girls/Boys ratio 1990  20602  0.830  0.231  0.2  1.42 
Girls/Boys ratio 2000  18534  1.013  0.186  0.54  1.83 
Women Parl. 1990  22325  11.089  3.919  0  38.4 
Women Parl. 2000  22344  16.883  5.479  0  42.7 
Youth LFP 1980  22675  69.550  7.442  59.27  95.72 
Youth LFP 1990  22675  71.634  8.110  58.79  96.05 























   51 
Table A4 




   
Women all  
   
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Number of children ever born  240384  1.726  1.757  0  12 
Up to 12 years of college  240384  0.602  0.490  0  1 
Some College  240384  0.215  0.411  0  1 
Employed  236691  0.577  0.494  0  1 
Unemployed  236691  0.056  0.231  0  1 
OLF  236691  0.367  0.482  0  1 
Married  240384  0.636  0.481  0  1 
Divorced  240384  0.093  0.291  0  1 
Fertility country of origin 1990  233035  3.147  1.144  1.4  7.1 
   
Married Women 
   
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Children ever born  94625  2.375  1.725  0  12 
Wife-Age  94625  37.012  8.808  15  54 
Wife-Up to 12 years of school  94625  0.624  0.484  0  1 
Wife-Some College  94625  0.168  0.374  0  1 
Husband-Age  94625  40.646  10.065  15  90 
Husband-Up to 12 years of school  94625  0.566  0.496  0  1 
Husband-Some college  94625  0.159  0.365  0  1 
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Table A5 
List of Countries with and without pronoun drop  
(sample of second generation immigrants) 
 
 
Languages with Pronoun Drop  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, 
Rep. Korea, Macedonia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, 
Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Languages without Pronoun Drop  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, 
France,  Germany,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Netherlands,  New 
Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland*, United 
Kingdom 
*We include Switzerland in the non-pronoun drop category as two of the two official languages (French and German) belong 
to that category. We check the robustness of our estimates by excluding Switzerland from our sample. 